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Introduction
There is little doubt that the on-going sovereign debt and banking crisis 
within the Eurozone will have an enormous impact on the future of the 
European Union (EU). Indeed, the fate of the entire European project hangs 
in the balance. The eventual outcome of the crisis cannot yet be known as of 
this writing in August 2012, but anything within the wide array of possible 
outcomes—from a total collapse of European integration to a ‘two-speed’ 
Europe to a tight political union—will have a profound and lasting impact 
on the way the European states and peoples interact with each other.
For scholars interested in European foreign policy, it is crucial to note that 
he trouble in the Eurozone struck at a time when European foreign policy was 
already in flux: Greece reached agreement with the IMF over its first bailout 
package only five months after the Lisbon Treaty went into effect, creating the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) and the post of High Representa-
tive of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR). These two 
institutions were designed with the intention of facilitating the coordination 
of national foreign policies among EU member states, but the novelty of the 
Lisbon Treaty left considerable uncertainty about how member states would 
incorporate the EEAS and the HR into their foreign policymaking procedures. 
The turmoil in the Eurozone has only magnified the uncertainty sur-
rounding the future of European foreign policy, both in areas related to the 
Lisbon Treaty and in other areas as well: can an economically weakened 
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EU continue to use trade as a foreign policy 
instrument? Will austerity-induced cut-
backs to national defence budgets mean the 
end of the Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP)? Might, on the other hand, 
a new fiscal and political union finally 
make a ‘European Army’ feasible? 
While it is impossible to answer these 
questions with any degree of certainty, the 
goal of this essay is to develop a systematic 
understanding of the impact of the Euro Crisis 
on the present and future of European foreign 
policy. Because the crisis raises such profound 
questions about Europe’s role in the world, 
this topic remains a vital area of on-going 
research. Fortunately, the small existing litera-
ture on this topic has already provided some 
important insights on the impact of the crisis 
on EU foreign policy. Particularly, the two 
‘Scorecards’ published by the European Coun-
cil on Foreign Relations in early 2011 and early 
2012 (Vaïsse and Kundnani, 2011; Vaïsse and 
Kundnani, 2012) present a detailed picture of 
European foreign policy outcomes during the 
crisis era in a variety of geographical theatres. 
My approach in this study is somewhat 
different to the approach of the ECFR Score-
cards. Rather than focusing on the impact of 
the crisis on foreign policy towards different 
geographical regions, I examine the effects of 
the crisis on four of the EU’s foreign policy 
tools: trade and aid conditionality, acces-
sion conditionality, coordination of member 
state foreign policies through the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and 
the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP).1  I chose this approach with the hope 
of generating conclusions that apply across 
all geographic areas. Furthermore, I subdi-
1.   Many scholars would consider ‘Soft Power’ (Nye, 
2004) and/or the similar concept of ‘Normative Power’ 
(Manners, 2002) to be important EU foreign policy tools. 
However, I do not include them in this study both be-
cause they do not officially exist ‘on paper’ as the other 
four mechanisms do, and because their effects can oper-
ate through the mechanisms included in this study.
vide my study into two different timeframes: 
in the first, I focus on the impact the crisis 
has had so far on each of the five EU foreign 
policy tools; in the second, I examine how 
each of these tools might look and function 
in a post-crisis Europe that has progressed 
to a fiscal union among its Eurozone ‘core.’
The general conclusion of my study is that, 
while the crisis has impacted each foreign pol-
icy mechanism to a different extent, the effects 
of the crisis so far on European foreign policy-
making have actually been surprisingly minor. 
Not only do I demonstrate in this paper that 
many of the key instruments of EU foreign 
policy have continued to operate in a rela-
tively normal manner since 2010, I also argue 
that many of the important trends impacting 
the future of European foreign policy began 
long before the current economic crisis did. 
The organization of the essay is as follows: 
in Section I, I specify the four tools of EU 
foreign policy on which this study focuses, 
and I provide some background on each; in 
Section II, I detail the impact that the crisis 
has had to the present on these four tools; 
in Section III, I examine the long-term pros-
pects of these tools of EU foreign policy. 
The EU’s Foreign Policy Tools
The European Union conducts foreign 
policy through a wide variety of channels, 
on a wide variety of issue areas, and at a 
wide variety of political levels. By ‘foreign 
policy,’ I am referring to all the means used 
by policymakers “to exercise power, i.e. to get 
others to do what they would otherwise not 
do” (Baldwin, 1985: 9). While a full overview 
of the institutional structure of the European 
Union is beyond the scope of this essay, my 
goal in this section is to briefly outline the 
four broad mechanisms of EU foreign policy 
on which this study focuses. While I acknowl-
edge that this categorization is something 
of an oversimplification of the enormously 
	 The	Euro	Crisis	and	the	Future	of	EU	Foreign	Policy		 3
complex world of EU foreign policy, my aim 
is to capture as many of the most significant 
aspects of EU foreign policy as possible 
within a straightforward framework.  
 
Trade and Aid
The EU’s oldest foreign policy strategy, 
dating back to the 1957 Treaty of Rome, is 
to offer preferential trade partnerships and 
development aid to certain states. Although 
the trade and development policies of the 
European Community were originally 
designed for the purpose of binding France’s 
former colonies to Europe (Bartels, 2007: 
717-719), the geographic reach of these 
relationships has since expanded, and now 
nearly every country in the world has some 
kind of formal economic agreement with 
the European Union (K. Smith, 2008: 57). 
Since 1995, however, these agreements 
have come with ‘strings attached,’ which are 
designed to affect the behaviour of non-EU 
states by conditioning the continuation of 
these trade and aid agreements upon the third 
state’s fulfilment of certain criteria relat-
ing to human rights and good governance 
(Bartels, 2007: 738). Conditionality enables 
the EU to take a ‘carrot and stick’ approach, 
rewarding cooperative states with positive 
incentives such as more aid and closer trade 
relations and punishing troublesome states 
by withholding funds and market access 
(Juncos, 2011: 371-372). In the most extreme 
cases, the EU can even impose trade sanctions 
on certain states (See Holland, 1987 for the 
example of South Africa). There is a significant 
debate in the literature about whether the 
EU’s true intent in imposing conditionality 
is to advance its stated goals of promot-
ing human rights and good governance or 
whether the EU is really motivated by neo-
realist goals (scholars in the latter group, e.g. 
K. Smith, 2003 and Brummer, 2009, observe 
that human rights conditionality is usually 
enforced only on geopolitically ‘irrelevant’ 
states and almost never enforced on states 
like Russia and China), but there is no doubt 
that trade and aid conditionality is a key 
foreign policy tool of the European Union.
In terms of EU institutional structure, trade 
and aid may be the one foreign policy mecha-
nism where the Commission has the most 
influence, as it is largely responsible for the 
EU’s trade negotiations. However, member 
states also retain significant influence here, 
since changes to trade relationships, includ-
ing conditionality-based sanctions, require 
member state approval via the Council. 
Accession Conditionality
As a foreign policy tool, accession condi-
tionality can be viewed as a particular subset 
of trade conditionality: when a state seeks to 
pursue the closest possible trade relationship 
with the EU, i.e. becoming a member itself, the 
EU gains tremendous leverage over that state 
by having the ability to dictate the conditions 
of its accession. Like trade conditionality, this 
is an area where both the Commission and 
the individual member states have influence, 
since the Commission manages accession 
negotiations but final approval requires 
unanimous assent by the member states. 
Historically, accession conditionality 
was first used to a significant degree in the 
1990s, as the former-communist countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) sought 
to formally join the European Union. The 
EU conditioned the membership of these 
states upon their adoption of democratic 
reforms, free-market economic policies, and 
the entire body of the acquis communautaire. 
Starting in the late 1990s and continuing to 
the present, similar conditionality has been 
imposed on states in the Western Balkans 
that seek to join the European Union, with 
the added burden that these states’ member-
ship is also conditioned on their cooperation 
with the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia and their guaran-
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tees of domestic minority rights (See Piana, 
2002; Pippan, 2004). However, there is some 
debate in the literature about whether this 
form of conditionality has been as success-
ful in promoting reforms in the Balkans as 
it was in CEE, since promises of potential 
membership to the Balkan states may not be 
as credible (See Fakiolas and Tzifakis, 2008). 
Coordination of Member State Foreign 
Policies
In this category, I refer to the coordina-
tion at the EU level of areas of foreign policy 
reserved to the member states themselves. 
This coordination takes the form of discus-
sions among member state officials within 
the framework of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) that are facilitated by 
the EU-level institutions such as the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy and the European 
External Action Service (EEAS). The current 
CFSP has a long history, originally established 
as the European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
in 1970, an informal negotiating body that 
had neither a secretariat nor any formal link 
to the European Community until 1986. (For 
a more in-depth history of the EPC and CFSP, 
see Nuttall, 1992 and M. Smith, 2004). The 
Maastricht Treaty rebranded the EPC as the 
CFSP, increased the size of the secretariat, 
and granted member states the ability to 
formulate official ‘Common Positions’ and 
to undertake ‘Joint Actions,’ all by unanim-
ity (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, 2002). The 
Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 created the post of 
High Representative for the CFSP and added 
a Policy Planning Unit to the CFSP’s secre-
tariat located in Brussels. The 2009 Lisbon 
Treaty, however, made perhaps the most 
significant changes yet to the CFSP by creating 
the European External Action Service (EEAS) 
and combining the two posts of High Repre-
sentative for the CFSP and External Relations 
Commissioner into the new post of High Rep-
resentative of the Union for Foreign Affairs 
and Security Policy (See Missiroli, 2010). 
Despite the growth of EU-level institu-
tions located in Brussels for the purpose of 
coordinating national foreign policies, the 
CFSP remains an area of EU foreign policy 
that is completely dominated by the mem-
ber states.  Since virtually any action on the 
EU-level requires member state unanimity, 
such action can only occur where member 
state preferences are highly converged. 
While this is a significant barrier to policy 
coordination on many issues, the CFSP has 
nonetheless played a major role in recent 
years in coordinating member state positions 
on issues like climate change, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, and relations with China.
The Common Security and Defence 
Policy 
Although Common Security and Defence 
Policy (CSDP) missions should in many ways 
be seen as a subset of the category of coordi-
nated member state action described above, 
the CSDP in my judgement is unique and 
significant enough to merit a category of its 
own. The CSDP (formerly the European Secu-
rity and Defence Policy, or ESDP) resembles a 
‘watered down’ version of a European mili-
tary, allowing member states to band together 
to send troops abroad for specific missions 
of limited duration. ESDP/CSDP missions 
have been activated in pursuit of both ‘civil-
ian’ goals (e.g. election monitoring and police 
missions) and ‘military’ goals (e.g. peacekeep-
ing missions, sometimes in conjunction with 
UN and NATO missions in the same area). 
The idea for the ESDP/CSDP originated 
in the 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration between 
Britain and France, which argued that the EU 
ought to “play its full role on the international 
stage,” and therefore required “the capacity 
for autonomous action, backed by credible 
military forces, the means to use them, and 
a readiness to do it, in order to respond to 
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international crises.” The ESDP became a 
reality in 2003, with the EU member states 
initiating the first missions in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-
nia (for a more in depth history, see Reichard, 
2006). Like any CFSP matter, the creation of 
a new CSDP mission requires member state 
unanimity; despite this high bar, member 
states have so far initiated over 30 missions.2 
The Impact of the Euro Crisis to  
the Present
In this section, I examine each of the four 
EU foreign policy mechanisms described 
in the previous section in order to ascer-
tain how the on-going Euro Crisis has 
impacted its use thus far. My approach here 
is to survey available data to produce as 
objective an evaluation as possible, before 
turning to a speculative analysis about the 
future of these mechanisms in Section III. 
Perhaps the main challenge in this sec-
tion is to recognize that the EU is facing a 
“crisis-upon-decline,” (Youngs, 2012: 1), a 
situation produced by “the double whammy 
of a short-term crisis superimposed on a 
more structurally-rooted incremental loss of 
power” (1). Although the region’s economic 
and financial troubles may be exacerbating 
this secular decline, I attempt as much as 
possible here to separate the unique impact 
of the Euro Crisis from changes in EU foreign 
policy that ‘would have happened anyway’ 
because of long-term trends. This neces-
sarily involves some counterfactual, but I 
believe that such a distinction can be made. 
Trade and Aid
The European Union’s ability to use trade 
2.   CSDP mission data from www.csdpmap.eu/mission-
chart. Accessed 20 September2010.
and aid conditionality as a foreign policy tool 
rests entirely on the EU’s economic prosper-
ity, which makes Europe such an attractive 
trade partner and aid donor to non-member 
states. Thus, one might expect that a major 
economic crisis would have a large impact 
on the EU’s ability to use these tools.
Surprisingly, however, the data sug-
gest that this is not the case. Although the 
EU’s economic prosperity relative to the 
rest of the world has been declining for a 
long time, the Euro Crisis appears to have, 
at worst, merely exacerbated an inevitable 
secular trend. The best way to illustrate 
this is to plot the EU’s share of world Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) over time: 
Figure 1: EU-27 GDP as a Share of World  
Total, 2000-20173 
 
GDP, a measure of a country’s total income 
over the course of a year, is a rough proxy 
for market size, since it represents the total 
amount of goods and services that a year’s 
3.   Data from IMF World Economic Outlook Database, 
April 2012. Accessed 20 August 2012. Data for 2011-
2017 are forecasts. To avoid the distortion caused by 
new countries joining the EU in 2004 and 2007, the GDP 
measure includes anachronous data from the entire EU-
27 in each year, even before the 2004 and 2007 cohorts 
acceded.
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worth of income is capable of purchasing. 
Thus, the EU’s share of global GDP is a use-
ful measure for the bloc’s attractiveness as a 
trading partner. The larger the share of global 
GDP produced by the EU, the more important 
the EU is as a trading partner to non-member 
states, and the more these states would be 
expected to abide by EU-imposed conditions 
for the sake of winning a trade agreement. 
Significantly, Figure 1 displays a long-term 
decline in the EU’s share of world GDP that 
began long before the Euro Crisis erupted and 
does not appear to have noticeably acceler-
ated around 2010. Admittedly, the EU’s share 
of world GDP is not a perfect measure for 
the utility of trade conditionality as a for-
eign policy instrument. (It is quite possible, 
for instance, that as global trade contracted 
during the 2008-2009 financial panic and 
recession, trade conditionality simply became 
a less effective foreign policy for every state. 
The GDP measure would not show such an 
effect.) However, what this measure does 
conclusively show is that the Euro Crisis has 
not caused a unique, relative loss of power 
for Europe in the area of trade conditionality. 
Indeed, despite the economic crisis, the EU 
has entered into new conditionality-laden 
trade agreements since April 2010 with several 
countries, including South Korea (October 
2010) and Peru (March 2011), and negotia-
tions with many other states are on-going.4 
Data on foreign aid budgets likewise 
demonstrate that the unique impact of the 
crisis has been minor. In the EU-27, there are 
28 foreign aid budgets: one from each member 
state, and one from the European Community 
4.   Information on the EU trade agreements with South 
Korea and Peru is available at the European Commis-
sion’s webpage on trade agreements: <http://ec.europa.
eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-relations/
agreements/#_other-countries> Accessed 24 August 
2012. Information on on-going trade negotiations 
is available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf>. Accessed 24 
August 2012.
itself. Although the European Community 
disburses development and humanitarian aid 
through several vehicles, the largest of these 
is the European Development Fund (EDF), 
which is funded by member states to the tune 
of roughly €3.5 billion per year. The EDF is 
re-negotiated every six to eight years, and 
in each of these negotiations, member states 
commit themselves to donating a specified 
amount of development aid per year until the 
next re-negotiation. This is significant because, 
by (un)fortunate chance, the most recent EDF 
re-negotiation occurred in 2008, on the eve 
of the crisis, and it bound member states to 
donating a total of over €22 billion until the 
next re-negotiation in 2013 (EDF, Europa.eu, 
2012). Thus, at least until the end of 2013, the 
EDF will remain relatively unaffected by the 
crisis. That is, unless a large member state 
reneges on its promise, which is unlikely. 
Furthermore, it appears that the 
Euro Crisis has also failed to undermine 
the 27 member state foreign aid budg-
ets, at least as of 2010, the most recent 
year for which data are available: 
Figure 2: Official Development Assist-
ance as a Percentage of GNI5 
 
 
5.   Data from Sustainable Development: Global Partner-
ship Indicators, Eurostat, 2012. Accessed 20 August 2012.
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This graph shows that member state dona-
tions of Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) as a percentage of Gross National 
Income (GNI: a measure similar to GDP but 
calculated slightly differently) did not signifi-
cantly decline in 2010 as the crisis in Greece 
took hold. Indeed, across the entire EU, the 
average ODA donation as a share of GNI 
actually increased slightly from 2008 to 2010.6  
All of this suggests that, at least through 
2010, the EU remained a crucial donor of 
foreign aid and therefore retained the abil-
ity to use aid conditionality as a foreign 
policy instrument. As data is released for 
2011 and 2012, it will be possible to examine 
whether the situation has since changed. 
Accession Conditionality
Like trade and aid conditionality, accession 
conditionality seems surprisingly resilient as 
a foreign policy instrument despite the Euro 
Crisis. Doomsayers may argue that the eco-
nomic crisis has scratched the shine off of EU 
membership to the point where prospective 
members will no longer be willing to abide 
by the EU’s strict political-economic condi-
tionality and implement the arduous acquis 
communautaire in order to gain membership. 
According to this narrative, the EU has there-
fore lost a powerful source of influence over 
states that might otherwise have been lining 
up to join the EU. However, there is simply 
no evidence to support such pessimism.
No region illustrates the EU’s continu-
ing influence over potential members more 
than the Western Balkans. While the EU has 
long struggled to help bring stability to this 
region, its efforts appear to be paying off, as 
much of the region continues to seek EU 
6.   However, real GDP declined slightly across the EU-
27 from 2008-2010, so a slight increase in foreign aid as a 
percentage of GNI indicates nearly constant levels of aid 
in real terms. (GDP data available at National Accounts: 
GDP and its main components, Eurostat, 2012. Accessed 
20 August 2012.)
membership. This is most obvious in Croatia, 
which is set to officially accede to the EU on 
1 July 2013. Significantly, Croatia finished its 
accession negotiations in June 2011 and held 
a public referendum in which 66% of the 
population voted in favour of EU member-
ship in January 2012 (BBC, 2012); both of these 
events occurred well after the on-set of the 
Euro Crisis, which does not appear to have 
significantly deterred the Croats. Likewise, 
Montenegro has also pushed ahead with its 
membership bid despite the crisis, gaining 
official EU candidate status in December 2010 
and commencing accession negotiations in 
June 2012 (Montenegro, Europa.eu, 2012). 
Even Serbia, one-time pariah state, has taken 
crucial steps towards EU membership since 
the outbreak of the economic crisis. Perhaps 
most significantly, Serbian forces arrested 
accused war criminal Ratko Mladic in May 
2011, fulfilling a key condition that enabled 
Serbia to become an official EU candidate 
in March 2012 (Serbia, Europa.eu, 2012). 
The Euro Crisis has dissuaded none of these 
countries from continuing to accept EU 
conditionality in pursuit of membership.
Sceptics may yet point to the example of 
Turkey, which began EU accession negotia-
tions in 2005, yet, according to some analysts 
(Möckli, 2012b: 70), no longer appears inter-
ested in membership. One might observe 
that Turkey’s economy has boomed in recent 
years, just as Europe’s has sank into reces-
sion, and conclude that Turkey no longer 
views EU membership as necessary for its 
long-term economic prosperity. While there 
may be some truth to this story, it misses a 
crucial point: it has been clear now for several 
years that Germany and France would never 
accept Turkish membership in the EU, and 
that Turkey therefore has no realistic chance 
of joining (BBC, 2006). Thus, Turkey is not an 
example of the Euro Crisis undermining the 
use of accession conditionality as a foreign 
policy instrument; rather, what undermined 
accession conditionality in the case of Tur-
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key was that Turkish politicians concluded 
that promises of EU membership were not 
credible. As Juncos (2011: 372) explains, 
successful conditionality programmes must 
rest on credible promises of rewards for 
the target country. Without such promises, 
a rational state has no incentive to uphold 
its end of the conditionality agreement. 
 
Coordination of Member State 
Foreign Policies
Unlike the previous two foreign policy 
mechanisms, the Euro Crisis has more 
clearly affected member state coordina-
tion of national foreign policies through the 
CFSP and the related Lisbon Treaty institu-
tions. Despite some setbacks, however, this 
area of EU foreign policy has nevertheless 
recorded some recent successes. Thus, 
again, the impact of the Euro Crisis on EU 
foreign policymaking has not been as det-
rimental as one might have predicted.
There are three primary reasons why the 
Euro Crisis has had something of a harm-
ful impact on the coordination of member 
state foreign policies. The first reason is that 
the Euro Crisis has absorbed the bulk of the 
attention of European policymakers, taking 
their focus off of foreign policy and raising the 
opportunity cost of the time spent collaborat-
ing on non-economic matters (Möckli, 2012: 
68; Gaspers, ECFR Report, 2012). The second 
is that the crisis has produced new tensions 
among member states, particularly between 
the surplus nations in the ‘North’ and the 
debtor nations in the ‘South.’ These tensions 
have contributed to the erosion of the spirit 
of goodwill and common purpose among EU 
member states necessary for the coordination 
of national foreign policies (Techau, 2012; 
Möckli, 2012: 68; Youngs, 2012: 3). Finally, the 
crisis has also limited the material resources 
available for CFSP projects. Although national 
defence budgets have remained relatively con-
stant as a percentage of GDP through 2010 (As 
Figure 3 shows, with the caveat that EU GDP 
declined slightly from 2008-2010, so a constant 
level of defence spending as a percentage of 
GDP indicates a small decline in real terms), 
member state contributions to EU-level 
security and defence institutions have been 
squeezed by the economic crisis (Möckli, 2012: 
68; Behr, ECFR Report, 2012; Vaïsse, Brookings 
Report, 2012). Many scholars have predicted 
that, in the long run, reduced defence budgets 
will force EU member states to integrate more 
of their security and defence policies. But 
in the present, fiscal pressure has curtailed 
the ability of member states to conduct their 
individual security policies at the EU level.
Figure 3: Defence Spending as a Percent-
age of GDP for Selected States, 2000-20107 
 
These factors together have produced what 
Vaïsse (Brookings Report, 2012: 11) calls a 
“creeping renationalisation of foreign policy.” 
For instance, in both 2010 and 2011, the Euro-
pean Union was unable to hold a united line 
on its human rights policy towards China, 
with certain states each year undermining the 
EU’s official position by adopting a more 
7.   Data from Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute Military Expenditure Database, 2012. Accessed 
20 August 2012.
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lenient stance in their own bilateral nego-
tiations with China (Vaïsse and Kundnani, 
2011: 33; 2012: 35). Because of this, the EU 
has begun over the last few years to shift its 
multi-issue ‘strategic partnership’ negotiations 
with China into a more narrow focus on trade 
issues alone (Youngs, 2012: 6). A similar trend 
has appeared in EU negotiations with India 
and ASEAN (6). Disunity among EU member 
states also plagued European foreign policy 
during the 2011 ‘Arab Spring,’ with France 
and Italy initially unwilling to abandon 
regimes in North Africa that had been long-
time allies. (Vaïsse and Kundnani, 2012: 96). 
Fiscal pressure on the CFSP also had a clear 
limiting effect on EU policy during the Arab 
Spring: even after member state positions 
coalesced around the idea of supporting dem-
ocratic transitions in the region, the EU was 
unable to substantially increase funding to the 
region to incentivise political reform. Much 
of the additional funding the EU did manage 
to provide to the region was diverted from 
its budgets for Asia and Latin America (99). 
Despite these setbacks however, member 
states collaborating under the CFSP have also 
achieved some key foreign policy successes 
since the beginning of the Euro Crisis. Per-
haps the most significant of these successes 
is the EU’s unified imposition of economic 
sanctions on Iran in early 2012 (Möckli, 2012: 
68), including sanctions on Iranian banks 
and an oil embargo effective in July 2012. In 
its dealings with Iran, the EU has presented 
a remarkably unified face, and it has coop-
erated effectively with the United States 
(Vaïsse and Kundnani, 2012: 74). Another key 
success of cooperative foreign policy is the 
EU’s external relations on climate change. 
At the December 2011 climate change talks 
in Durban, South Africa, the EU managed to 
negotiate as a united front, under the leader-
ship of Climate Change Commissioner Connie 
Hedegaard, in favour of an extension of the 
Kyoto Protocol (122). Thus, while the Euro 
Crisis has certainly had a negative impact 
on the coordination of member state foreign 
policies, its collateral damage has not been 
as catastrophic as one might have expected. 
The Common Security and Defence 
Policy 
The Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) has remained an active EU foreign 
policy tool despite the Euro Crisis. However, 
the story here remains somewhat ambigu-
ous, and the full impact of the crisis on this 
instrument may not be seen until 2013 and 
onwards. The first observation relevant to 
understanding the impact of the crisis on 
the CSDP is to note that the number of on-
going CSDP missions has not significantly 
declined since the Greek bailout in 2010:
Figure 4: Total Number of On-Going  
ESDP/CSDP Missions in Each Calendar  
Year, 2003-20158 
 
As Figure 4 shows, the total number of 
CSDP missions on-going in each calendar 
year has remained relatively constant, averag-
ing roughly 15 missions in each year since 
2005. Unless an as-yet-unplanned mission 
8.   Data from www.csdpmap.eu/mission-chart. Ac-
cessed 20 September 2012. The data from 2013-2015 only 
include missions already approved for those years.
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commences before 31 December 2012, this 
year will feature a near-average 16 missions. 
However, Figure 4 also shows that the number 
of scheduled missions will drop off signifi-
cantly from 2013-2015 due to the expiry of 
the mandates of current missions. Whether 
this is significant or not is a matter of some 
contention. One the one hand, it is important 
to note that during the entire history of the 
ESDP/CSDP, mission mandates have rarely 
been extended more than 2-3 years into the 
future, which means that if a similar chart to 
the one above had been produced in 2007, 
it would have shown a similar drop-off in 
planned ESDP missions from 2008-2010 that 
never occurred. That is reason to believe 
that this planned obsolescence of the CSDP 
may yet be reversed. On the other hand, 
there is also reason to believe that it may not 
be. As Figure 5 (below) shows, the number 
of new ESDP/CSDP missions initiated in 
each year declined significantly after 2008:
Figure 5: New ESDP/CSDP Missions and  
Mission Mandate Extensions in Each  
Calendar Year, 2003-20129 
 
9.   Data from www.csdpmap.eu/mission-chart. Ac-
cessed 20 September 2012.
From 2003-2008, European Union leaders 
initiated an average of 4.5 ESDP missions 
per year. From 2009-2012, the corresponding 
average for new CSDP missions per year is 
merely one. The only reason the number of 
total missions has remained high through 
2012 is that an anomalously high number 
of existing missions saw their mandates 
extended in 2009 and 2010, as Figure 5 
shows. Yet the number of mandate extensions 
also dropped off significantly in 2011-2012. 
Should both of these figures remain low in 
the coming years, the number of on-going 
CSDP missions will rapidly decline. 
One must be careful not to conflate cor-
relation with causation, but it fairly clear that 
the region’s economic crises, both the global 
financial crisis in 2008-2009 and the Euro Cri-
sis from 2010, significantly contributed to the 
decline in new CSDP missions and mandate 
extensions. As previously explained in Sec-
tion 2.3, there are three possible mechanisms 
through which the crisis might undermine use 
of the CSDP: cost, distraction, and increased 
intra-member state rivalry. (However, it is 
not clear that the third factor has had much 
impact, since the ESDP/CSDP tends to 
avoid missions in geopolitically controver-
sial locations.) In 2009-2010, it appears that 
distraction was the primary cause of the 
decline in new missions and the rise in the 
number of mandate extensions: extending 
existing missions costs just as much as start-
ing new ones, but extensions require much 
less attention and planning, since the mission 
can just carry on doing what it was already 
doing. In 2011-2012, cost may have been the 
primary concern behind reducing the number 
of mandate extensions. The EU’s long-term 
economic decline does not account for this 
sudden drop-off; only the Euro Crisis does.
Thus, the CSDP has so far remained an 
important EU foreign policy tool despite 
the crisis, and the number of on-going mis-
sions at any given point has remained near 
the long-term average of 15.  It is there-
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fore premature to conclude that the Euro 
Crisis has undermined the CSDP. There 
are signs that it may do so over the com-
ing years, but this cannot yet be certain. 
The Long Term Outlook
In this section, I offer a speculative exami-
nation of how the tools of European foreign 
policy might function in a post-crisis Europe. 
Clearly, the future of these mechanisms will 
depend heavily on the exact outcome of the 
crisis, which cannot yet be known. If the entire 
European project collapses, then any unified 
European foreign policy would likely cease 
to exist. But as of this writing in August 2012, 
the most likely outcome of the Euro Crisis 
appears to be a “two-speed Europe” (Youngs, 
2012: 1-3): a more tightly-integrated core of 
Eurozone countries, possibly involving a 
fiscal union, and a more loosely integrated 
periphery that retains important links with 
the core but is perhaps not as tightly inte-
grated as the current European Union. This 
Europe will likely exist in a future in which 
the continent’s relative political and economic 
decline has progressed even further than 
it has to the present. While these outlines 
are necessarily vague, they provide rough 
framework within which one can speculate 
about the future of European foreign policy.  
Trade and Aid
Perhaps the most surprising finding in 
Section 2 in this paper is that the EU’s recent 
economic troubles have not significantly 
affected those foreign policy instruments 
which rely the most on economic prosper-
ity: trade and aid conditionality. Despite this 
current cause for optimism, the long-term 
prospects of these foreign policy instruments 
are not good. Below I reproduce Figure 1, 
displaying the EU’s share of world GDP, but I 
add in GDP data for several additional states: 
Figure 6: GDP as a Share of World Total for  
Selected States, 2000-201710 
 
Figure 6 demonstrates that the decline 
of the EU’s (and America’s) share of global 
GDP is driven by the rise of large emerging 
market states, particularly China and India, 
with China’s share of world GDP expected to 
pass the EU’s around 2016. While this find-
ing largely exonerates the Euro Crisis as the 
primary source of the EU’s relative decline, 
it does imply a more worrying situation for 
Europe in the future: even a robust economic 
recovery and the salvaging of the Euro 
project are unlikely to stem Europe’s slide 
against India and China. In the long-term, 
this trend suggests that Europe will no longer 
be able to rely on its status as the largest, 
wealthiest export market and most generous 
foreign aid donor as a means of extracting 
desired foreign policy outcomes, since other 
states will supplant the EU in these roles.   
Furthermore, even if an eventual resolu-
tion to the Euro crisis does result in a more 
tightly integrated EU with a banking and 
10.   Data from IMF World Economic Outlook Database, 
April 2012. Accessed 20 August 2012. Data for 2011-2017 
are forecasts. As in Figure 1, the EU figure deliberately 
includes anachronous data from the entire EU-27 in each 
year.
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fiscal union, that development is unlikely to 
significantly alter the prognosis of trade and 
aid conditionality. Trade and aid are already 
highly integrated areas of policy; the Euro-
pean Community has had legal competence 
over all matters of external trade and some 
matters of foreign aid since the 1957 Treaty 
of Rome. This is unlikely to change no mat-
ter how the current economic crisis ends, 
and so it appears that the utility of these 
economic instruments as tools of foreign 
policy is sliding inexorably downward. 
Accession Conditionality
The prognosis for accession conditionality 
is equally bleak. At some point in the future, 
the EU will simply run out of states that it 
will consider for membership. While this 
has nothing whatsoever to do with the Euro 
Crisis, accession conditionality from the outset 
has been a powerful-yet-fundamentally-
limited foreign policy instrument. I readily 
concede that the end of EU expansion may 
be a long way in the future: the accessions 
of Iceland and the Balkan candidate states 
(other than Croatia) are still years away, and 
several Balkan states have yet to achieve 
candidate status; likewise, a final resolu-
tion to the controversy of Turkish accession 
may also be decades away. Yet unless the 
EU is willing to significantly revise the long-
assumed limits of its willingness to expand 
(Ukraine? The Caucasus?), accession con-
ditionality will not be available forever. 
One potential mitigating effect comes from 
the idea of a “two-speed Europe.” Should the 
EU evolve as predicted into a tightly inte-
grated core and a loosely integrated periphery, 
the EU may become willing to admit certain 
states into that periphery that it would not 
currently consider for full membership. This 
would enable the EU to impose some degree 
of accession conditionality on these states. 
Yet although this arrangement might extend 
the longevity of accession conditionality 
as a foreign policy tool for a time, it seems 
inevitable that the EU will eventually reach 
some sort of absolute limit of expansion.
The CFSP and CSDP
Since the issues involved are related, in 
this section I discuss the future of the CFSP 
and the CSDP together. The future of these 
organs (and related EU-level accoutrements 
such as the EEAS) provides one of the more 
fascinating areas for speculation, as the 
region’s economic troubles struck at a time 
when these institutions were already in flux 
due to the Lisbon Treaty. The primary line of 
contention is whether or not the economic 
crisis will spur much closer integration of 
member state security and defence policies 
at the EU level, possibly including even the 
creation of a ‘European Army’, as origi-
nally proposed in the 1950 Pleven Plan. 
On one hand, there are a few reasons to 
believe that the crisis will instigate closer 
foreign policy coordination among member 
states, causing them to make greater use of 
EU-level institutions like the EEAS and grant 
a more prominent voice to the centralised 
High Representative. The first reason is that 
the EU member states are unlikely to be able 
to sustain their pre-crisis levels of defence 
spending, forcing closer cooperation on 
expensive foreign policy ventures (Techau, 
2012; Dijkstra, ECFR Report, 2012). The causal 
link between the economic crisis and defence 
budgets is quite clear: even in an optimistic 
scenario where Europe’s economies begin 
to recover quickly, the lingering shadow of 
unemployment and underemployment will 
depress government revenues for years to 
come, forcing permanent budget cuts in many 
areas. That lower defence budgets might 
instigate closer foreign policy cooperation 
is also plausible: the 2010 Ghent Initiative, 
a German-Swedish Joint proposal for the 
sharing of defence capabilities across the EU, 
stemmed directly from the 2008 financial crisis 
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and its fiscal impacts (Möckli, 2012: 76). The 
2011 announcement that the UK and France 
plan to share aircraft carriers also followed 
military budget cuts in these two states (Daily 
Mail, 2011). Taken to the extreme, one might 
even view these actions as the initial steps 
towards the creation of a ‘European Army.’
The second reason the Euro Crisis might 
spur closer foreign policy cooperation is that 
a potential fiscal union emerging from the 
crisis may facilitate the creation of a more 
centralised foreign policy (Youngs, 2012: 3). 
This argument can be understood from both 
a neofunctionalist perspective (Haas, 1958), 
i.e. fiscal integration within the core of the 
two-speed Europe will create ‘spill-over’ 
into the area of defence, or from a bureau-
cratic rivalry perspective (Dijkstra, 2009), 
i.e. fiscal integration will enrich EU-level 
bureaucracies, allowing them to succeed 
in grabbing foreign policy competencies 
from member states. Thus, many scholars 
expect more communitarisation of security 
and defence policy in post-crisis Europe.
However, my own view is that budget 
cuts and tighter fiscal integration will not 
necessarily produce a more robust CFSP that 
makes greater use of the High Representa-
tive and the EEAS, and will very likely not 
transform the CSDP into a ‘European Army.’ 
Assuming that the crisis is resolved as previ-
ously outlined, I envision a future CFSP that 
looks very much like the present one: a purely 
voluntary organisation where member states 
can cooperate on foreign policy items if and 
only if their interests converge. The rationale 
behind this view, drawing on intergovern-
mentalist theory (Moravcsik, 1993), is that 
member states have been more reluctant to 
pool sovereignty over diplomatic, security, 
and defence policy than any other policy 
area. Even as authority over trade, consumer 
product regulation, and carbon emissions has 
been ceded to the EU, member states have 
stubbornly retained sovereignty over the ‘high 
politics’ of their security and defence policies, 
only building institutions at the EU level that 
require unanimity among member states for 
initiating common action. There is simply no 
reason to believe that the creation of a fiscal 
union would initiate any more ‘spill-over’ into 
security and defence cooperation than exist-
ing integration in other areas has. Likewise, 
while budget cuts may spur member states 
to cooperate on foreign adventures in which 
their interests are aligned, there is no reason to 
assume that budget cuts will uniquely cause 
member state interests to converge in areas 
where they currently do not. Thus, as in the 
areas of trade and accession conditionality, 
the future of the CFSP may be determined 
not by the Euro Crisis, but by a trend that 
predates it: the extreme reluctance of member 
states to cede non-economic aspects of their 
own foreign policy competencies to the EU. 
Conclusion
Although the potential of the Euro Crisis 
to significantly affect the operation of the 
key mechanisms of European Union foreign 
policy seems obvious on the surface, the 
main conclusion of this paper is that the 
crisis has generally not had as significant of 
an impact to the present as one might have 
expected. Indeed, given the severity of the 
problems that Europe has faced since 2010, 
it is remarkable that the EU has proceeded 
as it has with the accession of Croatia, the 
initiation of four new CSDP missions, and 
the signing of conditionality-laden trade 
agreements with South Korea and Peru. 
One can only speculate about how the 
Euro Crisis will impact the future shape and 
functioning of the EU’s foreign policy tools. 
Certainly, many expect that closer integration 
on fiscal policy and banking regulation will 
place the EU on a path towards a more federal 
and communatarised foreign policy. However, 
my prediction is that the future CFSP and 
CSDP will look rather like the current CFSP 
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and CSDP, with both institutions serving as 
non-coercive fora in which member states 
can cooperate on foreign policy ventures 
when they find their interests to be aligned. 
Despite the push for further integration in 
economic areas, EU member states have 
repeatedly shown themselves to be reluctant 
to pool sovereignty over the ‘high politics’ of 
their foreign and security policies. Following 
this logic, I certainly do not expect anything 
like the 1950 Pleven Plan to re-emerge. 
Thus, while the on-going Euro Crisis is 
enormously significant for many reasons, 
and while it has impacted foreign policy-
making at the EU-level in many ways, it 
has not yet demonstrated itself to be an 
earth-shattering turning point in Euro-
pean foreign policy. For now, however, 
this remains a temporary conclusion to be 
revisited as events play themselves out.
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